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 12 Managing Risk in the Real World 
 We have put forward a series of arguments culminating in the idea that patient safety 
should be viewed as the management of risk over time. We have suggested that 
healthcare could draw on a much wider repertoire of strategies and interventions to 
manage risk and enhance safety. This has been a book of ideas and argument but we 
hope that these are both rooted in practice and have practical application. In this 
chapter we fi rst consider some of the more immediate implications as we see them 
and then consider the form a longer term exploration and development might take. 
 Implications for Patients, Carers and Families 
 The engagement of patients in patient safety has been a slow and diffi cult process. 
Much of the initial effort has gone into engaging patients alongside staff in report-
ing and acting on safety issues. This has been a valuable exercise but there is 
always (rightly) going to be a limit on what it is reasonable or feasible for patients 
to take on in hospital. We should now turn our attention to the home and commu-
nity which will pose very different safety challenges. For instance, nosocomial 
infections are common in hospitals but we have developed effective ways of coun-
tering them which rely on close monitoring and a rapid clinical and organisational 
response. In the home, the risk of nosocomial infections may be less but other risks 
arise from the open environment, frequent visitors and varying standards of 
hygiene. Safety is a moving balance between accepted risks and available solu-
tions; you can improve safety either by changing the exposure to risk or improving 
solutions. 
 In the home and community patients are in charge of care, and therefore respon-
sible for safety, capable of making errors and being infl uenced by the many factors 
that affect safety. This is more than engagement, shared decision making or partner-
ship. Patients and families are taking on roles and responsibilities that are in other 
settings restricted to professionals. This raises a host of issues for the management 
of risk and indeed for the delivery of services generally. 
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 We know that patients and families take safety very seriously and are ingenious 
in managing many potentially dangerous scenarios. We have given examples in the 
book and no doubt many more could be collected and studied to reveal novel strate-
gies and interventions which could be shared, adapted and potentially used more 
widely. Our fi ve strategies can be used to pose some immediate questions about the 
risks managed by patients and families. What training should be given? If a profes-
sional needs training to, for instance, change a dressing while maintaining sterile 
conditions then surely patients and carers need training too. To what extent can 
standards of hygiene be relaxed simply because a sick person has moved from hos-
pital to home? We may need to consider setting standards and controlling the envi-
ronment in which care can be delivered. What kind of support do patients and 
families need if they are to monitor safety and act appropriately on signs of deterio-
ration? The example of home haemodialysis given earlier shows that advanced units 
are now including a suite of safety strategies in their training for patients and fami-
lies. This could potentially be replicated, in varying degrees of intensity, for other 
forms of care outside hospital. 
 Implications for Frontline Clinicians and Managers 
 In healthcare the word frontline is generally taken to mean clinical staff in direct 
contact with patients and whose actions and decisions have immediate effects. 
Managers do not deliver treatment and so are not frontline in that sense. They are 
frontline however in the sense that the actions of clinical managers have a very 
powerful infl uence on safety. A bed manager in a large hospital for instance is con-
stantly juggling patients and beds, assessing the latest request for an urgent bed, 
trying to place patients in wards that are at least reasonably appropriate and prevent-
ing very sick patients being in wards where the staff are not familiar with their 
needs. ‘Being in the wrong place’ is high risk if you are very sick. Clinical managers 
have a huge infl uence on safety but we know little about the strategies they use. 
 Both clinicians and managers can do a great deal to improve the standards and 
value of incident analysis. In the United Kingdom at least what was once an exercise 
in learning, refl ection and improvement has, in some settings, sadly deteriorated 
into a largely bureaucratic exercise producing numerous recommendations that can 
never be implemented. There is an urgent need to return to the original purpose of 
incident analysis, focus on the comprehensive investigation of a much smaller num-
ber of events and consider the fi ndings in the context of an overall safety and quality 
improvement programme. This can all be achieved with methods we already have. 
We also however need to explore the analysis of episodes of care with the attendant 
attention to contributory factors at different points, adaptation and recovery from 
problems, and much greater attention to the accounts of patients and families. 
 We believe that patients and families should select a proportion of the analyses 
and be encouraged to contribute as much as they can to analyses; their perspective 
is obviously particularly critical outside hospital. Their perspective will help us 
understand the longer term safety problems and to develop new techniques and 
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innovations. This perspective might seem utopian and to require huge resources; it 
would certainly require some careful organisation and the use of technology to 
bring in some participants. As before though, quality is more important than quan-
tity. A relatively small number of thorough investigations can produce a huge 
amount of useful information about the vulnerabilities, defences and resilience of 
the healthcare system. 
 Frontline teams, with management support, can initiate a much wider and more 
strategic programme of risk management than is currently the case. We could envis-
age the development of a decision tree in which different strategies and interven-
tions could be considered sequentially, both separately and in combination, as 
candidates to enhance safety in any particular setting and in response to identifi ed 
problems. Improving standards of practice is the most common approach to safety 
on the frontline and, if achievable, is an obvious and necessary fi rst step. Next there 
are multiple ways of improving the wider system, though many are not in the con-
trol of frontline teams. A critical task is to identify points in the system where inef-
fi cient processes and poor reliability are forcing time wasting and potentially 
dangerous workarounds; the adaptations are of course necessary at the time but 
wasteful in that they are simply a compensation for other defi ciencies rather than a 
necessary response to problems or crisis. Coping in the short term is admirable and 
may be in the best interests of that particular patient but the longer term this attitude 
is detrimental to safety in that it simply prolongs the underlying problems and 
removes any incentive for change. Risk controls, achieved with professional and 
management consensus, protect both patients and staff and could bring order and 
calm to currently chaotic systems. In emergencies of course risk controls can and 
should be over-ridden. 
 Monitoring, adaptation and response can be misused but is nevertheless an abso-
lutely critical safety strategy at every level of the system. A great deal has been 
achieved in team training in anaesthesia, surgery, emergency medicine and other 
clinical contexts. The skills of monitoring, cross checking and other features of 
human factors team training are widely taught and such programmes have been 
shown to improve safety and clinical outcomes. We need to devote much more 
energy to understanding how people at every level of the system adapt and respond 
to safety critical issues and develop methods of preparation and training in these 
skills. 
 One important direction of travel would be a parallel exploration of how these 
and other strategies are used by managers, particularly those directly involved in 
clinical services. Managers constantly adapt and fi refi ght; how much is necessary 
and how much unnecessary and due to poor systems? Which strategies and inter-
ventions are currently used day-to-day and at times of crisis and which would be 
optimal? We in no way wish to denigrate the skill and dedication of managers who 
go to extraordinary lengths to maintain safety. Rather, we want to move away from 
ad hoc improvisation towards explicit and planned interventions, preparation and 
training in the use of a portfolio of strategies and interventions. A huge amount 
could be learned from studying the ways managers adapt and cope and by refi ning 
this into a more strategic approach. A customised safety training programme for 
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managers, or perhaps pairs of managers and clinicians, would be high on our wish 
list for the future of safety. 
 Implications for Executives and Boards 
 In the United Kingdom and some other countries boards governing healthcare insti-
tutions include people from other sectors who bring very different expertise and 
perspectives. To an engineer, for instance, it can be very diffi cult to appreciate that 
what is tolerated in healthcare is very different from what is tolerated in engineer-
ing. Incidents brought to the attention of boards are often understood as horrifying 
and unusual departures from best practice, rather than as the inevitable by-product 
of the multiple vulnerabilities of an overstretched system. The most critical realisa-
tion at board level is the recognition of the extent of poor reliability, diffi cult work-
ing conditions and the corresponding necessity for ad hoc improvisation and cutting 
corners that is frequently necessary and often actively encouraged. Even clinical 
members of boards, who know this from daily experience, may struggle to make 
this explicit. This is a necessary background understanding to any effective action 
on safety and the inevitable compromises and trade-offs necessary in the delicate 
and fl uctuating balance between fi nance, safety, quality and patient experience. 
 An important observation in the implementation of the recently developed frame-
work for the measurement and monitoring of safety has been that the core ideas 
appear to resonate in different settings and at different levels of the healthcare sys-
tem. This is valuable in that an organisation could potentially cohere around a core 
set of safety questions which are meaningful to staff at all levels. We do not know 
how our framework of strategies and interventions will be received and to what 
extent they will be applicable at different levels of the system. We are conscious that 
the language and practice of safety improvement is more akin to frontline practice, 
while the language of control, assurance and mitigation are more familiar to those 
at executive, regulation and policy level. It would be enormously valuable if the 
safety community could fi nd a language and practice that spanned all levels and 
contexts, and which resonated with patients, frontline staff, executives and regula-
tors alike. We believe that it is achievable and could provide a much needed clarifi -
cation and integration of safety initiatives. 
 Boards too can employ a much wider range of strategies and interventions. A 
strategic combination of approaches and interventions is necessary to achieve opti-
mal safety in the face of fi nancial restrictions and constraints. An expansion of 
safety strategies may allow them to employ approaches such as risk control which 
are more familiar and akin to those employed in the management and oversight of 
fi nance. Boards often associate improving safety with spending more money, but a 
judicious combination of strategies and interventions may allow safety interven-
tions to at least be cost neutral overall. One might imagine for instance that controls, 
restrictions and improved reliability would reduce costs and permit the development 
of a programme for managers aimed at optimising the simultaneous management of 
safety, cost, quality and patient experience. This also may sound optimistic but we 
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believe is possible given a suffi ciently wide and well thought out safety 
programme. 
 At this level of an organisation the integration of strategies and programmes and 
the explicit trade-off between objectives is a critical skill. An organisational or 
regional change strategy is generally a combination of individual sub-programmes 
developed and led by different directors. The individual programmes almost inevi-
tably confl ict with each other. For example the ideal plan for reducing the debt at a 
satisfactory pace is generally detrimental to investments in staff and new technology 
and ultimately quality and safety. 
 The development of the fi nal strategy will rest ultimately with the Chief 
Executive, the board and a small group of senior leaders. They must arbitrate 
between the individual directors and programmes, create and maintain an overarch-
ing vision which encompasses all the objectives of the organisation. There are good 
and bad ways of achieving these compromises; each director must be willing to 
adapt his or her particular programme and integrate with other organisational objec-
tives and plans. The Chief Executive and other senior leaders need to be skilled in 
arbitrating and negotiating with all concerned to achieve a plan which achieves the 
objectives of the organisation without unduly compromising frontline quality and 
safety. 
 Scenarios of this kind are common currency in business school executive pro-
grammes but they very seldom include safety issues, at least for healthcare. 
Developing scenarios in which safety is managed in a realistic and clear sighted 
way in the face of fi nancial pressures would be a major step forward in the manage-
ment of risk. A particularly critical issue is the recognition of the early signs of 
organisational failure, both for those running organisations and for those attempt-
ing to monitor them externally such as regulatory agencies and government. 
Executive courses aimed specifi cally at the development of strategies which simul-
taneously address safety, fi nance and other organisational objectives are being 
developed and trialled in the oil and gas industries but have not yet been initiated 
in healthcare. 
 Implications for Regulatory Agencies and Government 
 Regulatory agencies face some major new challenges. Until now most regulation 
has focused on individual healthcare professionals or specifi c organisations and 
institutions. Regulation in its various forms now needs to extend to encompass new 
organisational forms and the complex series of transitions and interfaces along the 
patient journey. The accreditation of new types of organisation is already in prog-
ress in many countries but still requires further development; it is often not clear, for 
instance, what jurisdiction regulators have over patients living relatively indepen-
dently in residential care. Traditional approaches to certifi cation, inspection, and the 
corresponding evaluation criteria may have to be adapted considerably. To move 
from accreditation of structures and institutions to accrediting patient journeys 
across primary, secondary and home care is a huge challenge. 
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 A second major challenge is to fi nd a way of regulating a very rapidly evolving 
system. Regulators in most other industries are blessed with a relatively static envi-
ronment in which standards can be set and maintained over years or even decades; 
there is innovation of course but it does not usually lead to a change in core stan-
dards, simply a better way of meeting them. In aviation or the nuclear industry 
major changes may take 10 years from initial proposal to eventual implementation 
allowing ample time for the development of professional consensus, formal trials 
and the gradual absorption into the regulatory framework. 
 In contrast, the rapid pace of innovation in investigations and treatments in 
healthcare means that the regulator inevitably lags behind innovation. The fast pace 
of innovation makes developing new standards very challenging; standards can be 
developed quickly and adapted to a rapidly changing environment but only with a 
consequent reduction in rigour and testing, since formal evaluation cannot possibly 
be achieved within the time available. The present system cannot cope with the pace 
of innovation but it is far from clear how to develop new and more responsive modes 
of regulation. 
 Politicians and others at very senior level are under pressure to maintain the fi c-
tion that every citizen can have optimal healthcare. In private at least, it is absolutely 
critical that government and regulators recognise the vulnerabilities of the system 
and the gap between what is intended and what is actually delivered. The idea of 
absolute standards is naïve and potentially dangerous especially for struggling 
organisations. Innovation and the implementation of new and improved standards, 
all desirable, place huge pressures on both individual organisations and the wider 
system and create new safety issues. Many regulatory agencies understand this very 
well but may nevertheless struggle to fi nd an effective response to the issue. The 
problem of regulation is often conceived as the problem of fi nding good ways to 
detect this gap and identify poorly performing organisations. It is essentially a ‘best 
practice’ view of safety. However, the deeper problem of regulation is not so much 
identifying the departure from standards but about how to manage that gap intelli-
gently and humanely. The problem in our terms is one of monitoring, adaptation and 
response and to develop approaches that are strategic rather than improvised. 
 Regulatory agencies have developed very comprehensive approaches to inspec-
tion and have devoted most of the energies to monitoring compliance with stan-
dards. Much less attention has been given to the critical issue of how to respond 
when standards are not achieved. In many cases the response seems little more than 
admonition, threats and re-inspection. A basic risk control strategy would mean 
closing or limiting facilities when an inspection reveals fundamental problems but 
this threat is usually met with strong local resistance. The healthcare system either 
needs to overcome these obstacles or take stock and accept that no facilities cannot 
and develop a more sophisticated response to lapses in standards. We need, just as 
at other levels of the system, to consider how organisations and regulators might 
work together in a process of adaptation and ongoing monitoring of the gap between 
the ideal and the real. Delay in bringing the organisation to the point of compliance 
with standards, which can take months or even years, can be dangerous but there is 
seldom any explicit discussion of how to manage safety in the interim. The art of 
12 Managing Risk in the Real World
157
negotiation of realistic timescales for change and compliance needs exploration, 
research and development. 
 Future Directions for Research and Practice 
 This short book and these proposals are a fi rst step. We believe that there are imme-
diate implications but recognise that if the ideas have merit then they need to be 
debated, developed further and tested in practice by a community of people. The 
table in Chap.  11 provides, as we expressed it, an incomplete taxonomy. We know 
that much more work is need to map the full set of strategies and interventions, 
assess the value of the overall framework, the nature and purpose of the various 
interventions and their effectiveness in practice. Our experience so far from the 
small group of people who generously found time to read an earlier draft is that they 
recognised the need for a broader view of safety, for a breadth of strategic approach 
and particularly to the need to customise approaches to safety to different settings 
and along the patient journey. 
 The next step is broadly ethnographic. We need to observe, identify and collate 
safety relevant strategies and interventions at all levels of healthcare organisations 
and the wider system. Ideally these could be compared and matched with 
approaches taken in other industries. From there we could develop a more robust 
taxonomy of approaches and begin to assess which might be applicable in different 
contexts. A considerable amount of research and empirical work is needed to map 
the full set of strategies and interventions currently in use, who they are used by 
and in what context. From this point we could envisage empirical testing of differ-
ent approaches and combinations of interventions, similar to those already devel-
oped for best practice and system improvement but employing a wider repertoire 
of approaches and, most important of all, being tested at every level of the 
system. 
 Many ideas and approaches to safety have been advanced; the very term safety 
has been contested and defi ned in numerous ways. We have a plethora of concepts 
and organisational ideals to guide us on the safety journey. Many of these ideas 
however have remained as ideas and not found a concrete expression or applica-
tion. Our approach in contrast, abstract as it may seem to some, is resolutely 
practical in intention. The safety strategies and approaches we describe are all in 
use but have not been drawn together in a comprehensive architecture which 
attempts to embrace all healthcare settings. We have found in previous work that 
a unifying framework can be valuable to those managing safety at all levels of the 
healthcare system. We hope that our proposals and the attempt to develop an 
architecture of safety interventions will be useful now and productive for the 
future. 
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